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Abstract 
Abstract: In this paper, an account of theoretical integration in cognitive 
(neuro)science from the mechanistic perspective is defended. It is argued that 
mechanistic patterns of integration can be better understood in terms of 
constraints on representations of mechanisms, not just on the space of 
possible mechanisms, as previous accounts of integration had it. This way, 
integration can be analyzed in more detail with the help of constraint-
satisfaction account of coherence between scientific represen-tations. In 
particular, the account has resources to talk of idealizations and research 
heuristics employed by researchers to combine separate results and 
theoretical frameworks. The account is subsequently applied to an example of 
successful integration in the research on hippocampus and memory, and to 
a  failure of integration in the research on mirror neurons as purportedly 
explanatory of sexual orientation. 
Keywords: theoretical integration; mechanistic explanation; LTP; interfield 
theories; constraint-satisfaction. 
In this paper, I defend an account of integration in cognitive (neuro)science 
from the mechanistic perspective. I argue that previously proposed mechanis-
tic patterns of integration can be better understood in terms of constraints on 
representations of mechanisms, not just on the space of possible mechanisms. 
This way, integration can be analyzed in more detail with the help of con-
straint-satisfaction account of coherence between scientific representations. 
In particular, the account has resources to talk of idealizations and research 
heuristics employed by researchers to combine separate results and theoreti-
cal frameworks. 
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To illustrate this proposal, two examples will be outlined: (1) research on the 
hippocampus and memory consolidation, which is a classical illustration of 
multi-level research, according to Craver (2002; 2005); (2) a recent proposal to 
understand sexual orientation as related to the mirror-neuron system (Ponseti 
et al. 2006), which is an instance of a clear failure at inter-level integration 
(and more). 
 
1. Mechanistic integration, Craver and Darden style 
In this section, I will introduce the neomechanistic account of explanation and 
show how it relates to issues of integration and unification, particularly, in 
cognitive (neuro)science. What is notable is that the neomechanistic account 
does not stress the theoretical autonomy of psychology or cognitive science 
vis-à-vis neuroscience; in contrast, it argues for integrating research that 
spans multiple fields, without calling for a ruthless elimination of any of them. 
Then I will briefly describe the extant taxonomy of mechanistic integration as 
proposed by Craver and Darden. 
According to the neomechanistic account of explanation, to explain a phe-
nomenon φ is to elucidate the causal structure of the mechanism that gives 
rise to φ (Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000; Glennan 2002; Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen 2005). While there are multiple definitions for the term mecha-
nism, the core idea is that a mechanism is an organized system that comprises 
causally relevant component and operations (or activities). Component parts 
of the mechanism interact, and their organized operation contributes to the 
capacity of the mechanism to exhibit φ. (For a recent review, see, e.g., [Illari 
and Williamson, 2011]). 
The mechanistic account of explanation is privy to issues of inter-field re-
search (Darden and Maull 1977; Craver and Darden 2013). Inter-field theories 
relate to at least two fields of study. By a “field of study”, Darden and Maull 
mean “an area of science consisting of the following elements: a central prob-
lem, a domain consisting of items taken to be facts related to that problem, 
general explanatory factors and goals providing expectations as to how the 
problem is to be solved, techniques and methods, and, sometimes, but not 
always, concepts, laws and theories which are related to the problem and 
which attempt to realize the explanatory goals”13 (Darden and Maull 1977, 44). 
Two fields may appeal to the same spatiotemporal locations, entities, or activi-
ties, and one may provide a better understanding of the spatiotemporal rela-
tionships, causal relationships, physical nature, structure, or function thereof. 
                                                             
13 As Bechtel (1986, 11–13) notices, the central problems may be solved over time, which does not 
mean that the field or discipline is going to disappear; the fields should be therefore defined by 
a certain genealogy of problems rather than a single central problem. 
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However, in looking at cognition, it is clear that cognitive processes may be 
explained in different ways by various disciplines. 
The practice, methodology and theory of cognitive science do not rest on au-
tonomy from neuroscience. It is the opposite, as the boundary between cogni-
tive science and cognitive neuroscience is blurred. Defenders of the new 
mechanistic approach argue the functionalist explanations of cognitive capac-
ities are essentially incomplete explanations of mechanisms (Piccinini and 
Craver 2011). These are incomplete because they do not cite all causally rele-
vant factors for their explananda. Others have pointed out that functional 
analyses may lead to positing entities or activities devoid of any causal rele-
vance for the phenomenon (Miłkowski 2013, chap. 3), because the functional 
analysis yields factors sufficient for the functional capacity to appear 
(Cummins 1975). These factors may not be at play in a mechanism; hence, 
they may be causally irrelevant. Functional analyses may (1) fail to describe 
actual causal factors; (2) posit irrelevant or epiphenomenal factors instead. In 
contrast, mechanistic explanations reject the functionalist assumption that 
factors that are logically sufficient for the explanandum to occur are genuine-
ly explanatory. They need to be further constrained and become actual causal 
factors. This requires, arguably, meshing cognitive science with neuroscien-
tific research. Some even claim there has been a silent revolution that turned 
cognitive science into cognitive neuroscience (Boone and Piccinini 2015). 
For example, well-established results in neuroscience constrain psychological 
model-building; this is how one can define the role of double dissociations 
(Glymour 1994). While deemed highly controversial (Van Orden, Pennington, 
and Stone 2001), double dissociations help to delineate individual mecha-
nisms. Theorizing about different aphasias and underlying brain lesions is 
arguably mutually constraining, even if one cannot identify whole brain 
mechanisms to be juxtaposed.  
The new mechanistic approach does not render cognitive science obsolete vis-
à-vis neuroscientific or molecular explanations as other “ruthlessly reductive” 
accounts would have it (Bickle 2003). Instead, some argue that mechanisms 
are not made, in any sense, unreal when underlying factors are introduced 
(Craver 2005). While it may be still argued the new mechanistic approach is, 
in an important sense, reductive, as it appeals to some reductive heuristics in 
the search for explanations (Hensel 2013), these heuristics are not supposed to 
supplant more abstract explanations used in genuinely mechanistic explana-
tions (Levy and Bechtel 2013). While mechanists stress the importance of in-
terfield integration, they do not argue for replacement of some fields by other 
fields that study phenomena at smaller spatiotemporal scales. 
Cognitive science comprises multiple fields that contain stronger and weaker 
connections among them. The stronger the connection is between fields A and 
B, the higher the probability the models will integrate insights from both A 
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and B. In this paper, by a model of a mechanism M, I mean a scientific repre-
sentation of M, be it verbal, diagram-like, computational, or purely formal. 
Models are cognitive artifacts employed by researchers to describe mecha-
nisms, and this usage corresponds roughly to how the term model is used in 
cognitive science. Integration, in this context, refers to the combination of dif-
ferent models. But integration may not lead to complete unification. Unifica-
tion results from developing general, simple, elegant, and beautiful explana-
tions. Most published models in cognitive science are minimal—they focus on 
individual tasks, rather than all features of cognitive systems. Newell (1973) 
observed this may lead to disintegration and fragmentation as the stress on 
minimal models may create disunity. To avoid this, Allen Newell proposed 
redirecting the focus of research to cognitive architectures (Newell 1990). 
Cognitive architectures are hypotheses about the general organization of cog-
nitive mechanisms, and according to Newell, they seek to achieve theoretical 
unification. However, unification may occur on a much smaller scale. Unified 
explanations are intuitively assessed as simple, general, and beautiful, but 
they need not be the simplest, most general, and most beautiful. The appeal to 
aesthetic criteria may seem to invoke non-analyzable, elusive properties, and 
maybe this is the reason unification has rarely been analyzed by the defend-
ers of mechanistic explanation. Providing detailed elucidations of these prop-
erties goes beyond the scope of the current paper, as my focus is on integra-
tion and building larger integrative models that span multiple different fields 
(but see Miłkowski 2017). Unification in cognitive science may proceed (i) via 
schemes of structures or (ii) via elementary processes (Danks 2014, 176). 
Scheme-centered unification “arise when we have a collection of distinct cog-
nitive theories and models that are nonetheless all instantiations of the same 
type of structure (in some sense).” In other words, schema-centered accounts 
argue for cognitive unification “in virtue of some common template that is 
shared by all the individual cognitive models, rather than through shared 
cognitive elements (representations, processes, or both) across those models.” 
Process-based unifications try “to show how coherent cognition arises from 
shared processes, where those processes are typically small building blocks 
that combine to yield complex cognition” (ibid.). 
Let me put unification to side then and turn to integration. Darden and Craver 
(2013, chap. 10) have identified at least three ways mechanisms—and 
fields14—may become integrated. Clearly, listing them is not supposed to pro-
vide neither a systematic taxonomy of all the possible ways mechanisms can 
be integrated, nor a detailed understanding of what integration is. However, 
                                                             
14 Fields may be integrated in non-mechanistic ways (for example, when they do not rely on 
mechanistic explanations), and their integration may depend on further sociotechnical factors. 
I do not deal with the integration of fields as such in this paper. For a broader treatment of inte-
gration, including interfield integration, see (Bechtel 1986). 
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these three patterns are all based on simple juxtapositions or part-whole rela-
tionships, and this is probably what makes them particularly easy to observe 
and understand. 
Simple integration puts models of mechanisms together as pieces of a puzzle 
that fit together. Two fields may simply study cognition in a similar way, but 
may emphasize different mechanisms. For example, separate stages of visual 
processing may be studied in relative isolation and then combined to produce 
a larger mechanism. Notice that, in this case, all integrated models are on the 
same level of mechanistic organization, which shows simple integration is not 
inter-level. The notion of the level is understood in the mechanistic frame-
work in terms of proper part-whole relationships: whatever is a proper part of 
a larger mechanism is at the lower level of its organization (Craver 2007). 
Hence, simple integration occurs when no mechanism being integrated is 
a proper part of another. 
Inter-level integration occurs when another level of organization is added to 
complete an explanation: a larger mechanism may be proposed that contains 
the previous one, or a lower-level mechanism is added as a proper part of the 
previous mechanism. This integration usually encompasses the development 
of an existing explanation of a phenomenon by providing an underlying 
mechanism of the phenomenon (Thagard 2007). For example, my ability to 
recognize a certain visual pattern may be identified as a capacity of a mecha-
nism in the visual cortex. 
Inter-temporal integration puts one mechanism in the context of another 
mechanism that functions on another time-scale. Here, one mechanism be-
comes a temporal proper part of another mechanism. Think of developmental 
mechanisms shaping my perceptual capacities, for example, the ability to 
see colors. 
These three patterns of integration can be easily observed in cognitive sci-
ence. They correspond to spatial and temporal adjacency (simple integration) 
and spatial or temporal containment (inter-level and inter-temporal integra-
tion). What is supposed to be at play in research practices is more 
than these simple relationships. Craver has argued “different fields integrate 
their research by adding constraints on a multilevel description of a mecha-
nism” (Craver 2005, 373). In the next section, I will develop his account and 
propose a slight modification in the notion of constraint used to analyze inter-
field integration. 
2. Mechanistic integration as constraint satisfaction 
In this section, I elucidate the notion of constraint in the mechanistic litera-
ture, which has been framed in ontic terms. I argue for a slight modification: 
constraints that lead to integration (and, possibly, other kinds of methodologi-
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cal constraints) can be accounted for, more generally, if one considers their 
role in shaping scientific representations. In doing this, I refer to previous 
work on representational constraints and show how Thagard’s account of 
constraint satisfaction can shed light on interfield constraints. 
Craver defines his notion of constraint in the following way: 
A constraint is a finding that either shapes the boundaries of the space of 
plausible mechanisms or changes the probability distribution over that space 
(that is, the probability that some point or region of the space accurately de-
scribes the actual mechanism). Some constraints exclude regions of the 
space; they show that some set of possible mechanisms is impossible given 
what is known about the components and their organization … Constraints 
on the space of possible mechanisms, in short, constitute the relevant evi-
dence for evaluating how-possibly descriptions of mechanisms. Progress 
from how-possibly to how-actually descriptions of a mechanism can thus be 
conceived as a process of shaping and constricting the space of plausible 
mechanisms. (Craver 2007, 247–48). 
However, some specific epistemic constraints do not seem appropriately 
characterized as findings. Craver (2007, 26) lists several methodological prin-
ciples used by Wesley Salmon as constraints on the space of possible explana-
tions: 
(E1) mere temporal sequences are not explanatory (temporal sequences); 
(E2) causes explain effects and not vice versa (asymmetry). 
It seems more appropriate, therefore, to talk of some scientific representa-
tions as (mutually) constraining, as (E1) or (E2) is more appropriately de-
scribed as a methodological norm or principle rather than a finding. A causal 
model of a mechanism should be constrained by (E1) to be fully explanatory. 
One could also conceive several models of mechanisms as constraining some 
resultant overall model, which serves as their mechanistic amalgamation. 
These models may contain not only empirical findings, but also some method-
ological principles or methods (e.g., representational conventions used to cre-
ate computer simulations). 
Note, for example, one of the constraints mentioned by Craver (2007) is mutu-
al manipulability. This constraint appeals to causal considerations, which 
cannot be easily rephrased in terms of constraints understood as findings: it 
should be the case that entities and activities are appropriately mutually ma-
nipulable (that is, support bottom-up and top-down interventions), but the 
constraint is not a finding or discovery in any usual sense. 
One obvious way to evaluate my proposal to frame constraints as operating 
on representations is to compare ontic and representational accounts of con-
straints. Recently, David Danks has proposed a representational account of 
constraints to analyze inter-theoretic and inter-model relationships. This is 
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not mere terminological similarity but, arguably, an attempt to elucidate the 
same concept: “one theory S constrains another theory T if the extent to which 
S has some theoretical virtue V (e.g., truth, predictive accuracy, explanatory 
power) matters for the extent to which T has V” (Danks 2014, 31). This means 
that, if S constrains T because of a certain theoretical virtue, then if we care 
about this virtue in T, then we should care about it in S. Different virtues give 
rise to different constraints.  
In Danks’s analysis, constraints act upon representations, while Craver as-
sumes these operate on the space of possible mechanisms. This corresponds to 
the distinction between epistemic and ontic accounts of explanation. While 
the ontic and epistemic talk are largely interchangeable, there are notable 
differences. There may be some theoretical virtues related to idealization, and 
idealization introduces non-veridical scientific representations, which may be 
distorted descriptions of mechanisms. Constraining the space of possible 
mechanisms to find the idealized mechanism may be a futile endeavor, just 
because some idealizations may introduce entities or activities that are, strict-
ly speaking, physically impossible, such as mass points or frictionless motions. 
The space of possible physical mechanisms would then be empty. One solu-
tion is to look at the space of logically possible mechanisms, but it is not at all 
clear whether merely logically possible mechanisms explain anything ontical-
ly (and some idealizations are, strictly speaking, even logically impossible). 
Instead, one could talk of constraints over the space of descriptions of mecha-
nisms and hold that some parts of descriptions are not supposed to be explan-
atory, per se, but are indispensable in explanations for various reasons. Build-
ing idealized scientific representations may be justified, regarding their theo-
retical virtues, but is not best accounted for in ontic terms. 
A similar argument may be formulated, regarding other representational vir-
tues. One of the simplest axiomatizations of the propositional calculus offered 
by Jan Łukasiewicz in his notation is EEpqEErqEpr. The axiom is obscure even 
to those trained in Reverse Polish Notation (E stands here for binegation, 
should you wonder). Similarly, the most parsimonious representations may 
be cumbersome to use in scientific practice. So, one may require that the 
model of the mechanism be easy to use in a given scientific practice or that 
integrated models should be perspicuous. These requirements are easy to 
frame as theoretical principles constraining the representation. 
So, to sum up, the difference between the representational account of con-
straints, which explicitly appeals to theoretical virtues and the ontic account 
offered by Craver is that the first is simply easier to apply to scientific repre-
sentations in case of idealizations or other representational ideals, but can 
easily express the ontic requirements. This account is sufficiently similar to fit 
the mechanistic framework of explanation. 
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The weakest constraint described by Danks is a truth-constraint: two bodies of 
knowledge satisfy a truth-constraint if they can be both true at the same time. 
The received account of inter-theoretical reduction involves truth-constraints, 
as Danks argues. However, truth-constraining is a weak relation of logical 
coherence. The wave theory of light does not exclude the particle theory of 
light, so they satisfy the truth-constraint, even though they involve a different 
account of the basic nature of light. Basically, any mechanistic model M1 that 
does not deny another, M2, may be endorsed at the same time, and as far as 
M1 and M2 can be true, they would be truth-constrained, but not mechanisti-
cally integrated. 
Before I discuss mechanistic constraints deeper, it’s important to note another 
advantage of framing constraints in representational terms. Interestingly, 
applying the truth-constraint is a case of attaining logical coherence between 
representations, which is one of the kinds of coherence analyzed by Paul 
Thagard (2000). Thagard also uses the term constraint, and even if he offers no 
normal definition of this term, his contextual definition of constraint in terms 
of coherence is compatible with Danks’s account. Two kinds of constraints are 
introduced with two reductive definitions: “If two elements cohere, there is 
a positive constraint between them. If two elements incohere, there is a nega-
tive constraint between them” (Thagard 2000, 17). Thus, the ontic constraints 
that Craver describes as excluding some regions of the space of possible 
mechanisms are simply negative constraints. The positive constraints drive 
the search for the actual mechanism responsible for some explanandum phe-
nomenon in the space of possible mechanisms. 
Constraints may also be stronger or weaker, and attaining coherence between 
representations requires solving the coherence problem, defined this way: 
Let E be a finite set of elements {ei} and C be a set of constraints on E under-
stood as a set {(ei, ej)} of pairs of elements of E. C divides into C+, the positive 
constraints on E, and C-, the negative constraints on E. With each constraint 
is associated a number w, which is the weight (strength) of the constraint. 
The problem is to partition E into two sets, A and R, in a way that maximizes 
compliance with the following two coherence conditions: 
• If (ei, ej) is in C+, then ei is in A if and only if ej is in A. 
• If (ei, ej) is in C-, then ei is in A if and only if ej is in R. 
Let W be the weight of the partition, that is, the sum of the weights of the sat-
isfied constraints. The coherence problem is then to partition E into A and R 
in a way that maximizes W. Because a coheres with b is a symmetric relation, 
the order of the elements in the constraints does not matter (Thagard 
2000, 18). 
Thagard (2000, 28) analyzes the complexity of algorithms that might solve 
coherence problems, which are generally NP-complete, or non-tractable for 
practical purposes for non-trivial domains. There are, however, some good 
approximations based on heuristics, including a connectionist constraint-
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satisfaction algorithm preferred by Thagard. Even if most models of mecha-
nisms in life sciences remain semi-formal, with diagrams and verbal descrip-
tions being parts of complex scientific models, there are domains in which 
computational modeling is prominent. This includes cognitive science, in 
which around 80-90% of theoretical papers appeal to computational models 
(Busemeyer and Diederich 2010). This account of integration in terms of con-
straint satisfaction can also offer a practicable solution. 
If positive constraints and negative constraints may operate on models of 
mechanisms and on methodological principles, then an appropriately defined 
negative constraint may exclude models that do not satisfy methodological 
principles of causal explanation. Just because there are algorithms for find-
ing causal relationships in the experimental data (Glymour 2001; Spirtes, 
Glymour, and Scheines 2000), it seems possible, at least in principle, to use 
them to constrain the models of mechanisms by filtering out the mo-
dels  that  do not conform to observational data (see e.g., Triantafillou and 
Tsamardinos 2015). 
Models in cognitive science, even if stated in a machine-readable form, are 
admittedly still rarely integrated automatically, especially if they are supposed 
to conform to semantic constraints that refer to spatial and temporal proper-
ties of entities and activities in mechanisms; integrating them remains more 
art than science. But the constraint-satisfaction account of integration for 
mechanistic models does not serve merely a practical purpose. 
Constraints are not limited to truth values of models or their components 
(I have mentioned the causal constrain in passing). Otherwise, providing an 
integrated model of the mechanism would boil down to finding a minimal 
coherent model that satisfies this constraint. This is not the case, even for re-
duction in the classical sense (Nagel 1961). Danks (2014, 31) claims that “re-
duction is arguably the strongest possible inter-level constraint, so it can 
sometimes make sense to focus on finding reductions of some theory H.” 
Things are not so simple. Reduction need not lead to a deep unification if the 
reducing theory T1 is nothing but a language able to express another theory T2 
positing no substantial connections between its claims and the claims of T1 (cf. 
Bechtel 1986, 41). Truth-constraints guarantee no kind of unification, and 
even in the strongest case, inter-theoretical reduction, coherent models may 
satisfy these constraints with no substantial inter-model connections. 
In this context, it is important distinguish between mechanistic integration 
and non-mechanistic accounts of inter-model integration. As it relates to cog-
nitive modeling, weak truth-constraints may only be applicable to the model’s 
output or products of cognitive processes. Such modeling has been deter-
mined to offer a non-causal and non-mechanistic explanation (Irvine 2014). 
However, because most models of cognition aim at explaining cognitive pro-
cesses, the integration offered by non-mechanistic explanations that focus 
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merely on cognitive products, not processes, lacks depth and does not allow 
researchers to find common entities and processes in various models. Prod-
uct-oriented integrations and unifications are not entirely satisfactory, and 
from the mechanistic point of view, they are incomplete, as they do not satisfy 
the completeness norm for mechanistic explanations. The completeness norm 
requires the model of the mechanism contain all causally relevant variables 
(Craver 2007). (However, it does not require specifying all possible details, and 
it also does not exclude idealization (Miłkowski 2016).) 
Mechanistic constraints concern the entities and activities presupposed in 
integrated models, and this way, go beyond mere truth constraints. They are 
more of a semantic nature. Take the constraint that two integrated theories 
should appeal to the same entities: two theories of light no longer satisfy it, 
unless a unifying theory is proposed, for example, stating that light has both 
the nature of a particle and a wave at the same time. Theories of light are not 
mechanistic, as they do not explain phenomena with spatiotemporally deline-
ated organized systems of components and operations. The constraints may 
be also more specific; for example, there are spatial constraints that concern 
the size, shape, location, connection, and compartmentalization of component 
entities; only some may be initially satisfied. Table 1 lists constraints on the 
space of possible mechanisms enumerated by Craver. 
 
Table 1. Intralevel and interlevel constraints on multilevel mechanisms (Craver 2007) 
 
Intralevel constraints 
          Componency constraints 
                         Spatial constraints 
                                    Size 
                                    Shape 
                                    Location 
                                    Connection 
                                    Compartmentalization 
                         Temporal constraints 
                                    Order 
                                    Rate 
                                    Duration 
                         Active constraints  
               Interlevel constraints  
                         Accommodative constraints 
      Top-down accommodation 
      Bottom-up accommodation 
                         Spatial and temporal constraints  
                         Mutual manipulability constraints 
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Three patterns of integration introduced in the first section can be naturally 
accounted for in terms of mechanistic constraints. With simple integration, 
a larger mechanism is simply posited, and it is constrained in that its model 
should contain entities and operations of two (or more) mechanisms that con-
stitute it. The larger mechanism integrated in the inter-level way is con-
strained also to contain both mechanisms and, particularly, to have compo-
nents of the first mechanism identified with the second mechanism. In the 
inter-temporally integrated mechanisms, it is primarily the operations of both 
mechanisms that are supposed to be identified with one another (or some 
causal relationship is supposed to obtain between these two mechanisms).  
Craver stresses that integration is supported by multiple kinds of constraints. 
More complex integration can, therefore, go beyond the simple patterns we 
have seen before. But constraints in his sense are merely ontic, while, as we 
will see in the following sections, other kinds of constraints are used in inte-
gration efforts in neuroscience. The present account directly corresponds to 
considerations cited in the previous mechanistic accounts of integration and 
underlines the representational role of these constraints, that is on how they 
work on the descriptions or representations of mechanisms.  
Just because the constraint satisfaction account can describe all previously 
found kinds of integration and more, it is a slightly more general proposal for 
a unifying account of mechanistic integration. But it remains to be shown that 
it is both descriptively and normatively adequate. It should be possible to de-
scribe integrated models of mechanisms via constraints, and good integrated 
models should be distinguished from bad. To demonstrate the account has 
these features, two cases studies will be examined.  
The first is a relatively well-studied case of Long Term Potentiation (LTP) as 
involved in mechanisms of memory. It is an example of a successful integra-
tion of psychological constraints in neuroscientific theories. The constraint 
account is more plausible than simple inter-level integration. It will be also 
shown that the research program is constrained by some theoretical and 
methodological considerations, not just by findings related to mechanisms. 
The second case is an example of a failed integration—namely the case of the 
hypothesis of mirror neuron system (MNS) in the account of sexual orienta-
tion (or rather: in sexual arousal elicited by stimuli compatible with one’s 
sexual orientation). I will argue it fails for multiple reasons, not only because 
the models of mechanisms posited for sexual arousal are not constrained 
mechanistically by the MNS, but also because methodological principles of 
causal explanation are not adhered to. 
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3. Hippocampus and memory 
LTP is now believed to be a process of synaptic plasticity involved in mecha-
nisms of memory, and the discovery of the mechanistic link between LTP and 
the hippocampus (Bliss, Gardner-Medwin, and Lømo 1973; Bliss and Gardner-
Medwin 1973) was studied by Craver (2003; 2005; 2007), who opposed Bickle’s 
(2003) ruthlessly reductive interpretation of this discovery. In the 1950s, the 
plasticity of the hippocampus (see Figure 1), which is a major component of 
the brains of human beings and other vertebrates, was experimentally con-
firmed (Green and Adey 1956). But plasticity was not yet linked to memory 
functions. 
 
Figure 1: Hippocampus as drawn by Santiago Ramón y Cajal 
  
 
The unsuccessful search for the dedicated mechanisms of memory, or the en-
gram, was summarized influentially by Karl Lashley: 
This series of experiments has yielded a good bit of information about what 
and where the memory trace is not. It has discovered nothing directly of the 
real nature of the engram. I sometimes feel, in reviewing the evidence on the 
localization of the memory trace, that the necessary conclusion is that learn-
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ing just is not possible. It is difficult to conceive of a mechanism that can sat-
isfy the conditions set for it. Nevertheless, in spite of such evidence against it, 
learning sometimes does occur (Lashley 1950). 
Lashley’s pessimism led researchers to assign other functions to the hippo-
campus. Lesion studies, such as the one conducted on the famous patient 
Henry Molaison (known in literature as H.M.), have shown that hippocampal 
lesions may have been responsible for his retrograde amnesia or his inability 
to remember new events. These were not unequivocal, however, as the sur-
gery on H.M. removed not only the anterior portion of the hippocampus, but 
also much of the hippocampal gyrus and the amygdala. 
The discovery that LTP contributes to memory consolidation is based on the 
premise that memories might be explained by changes in neural connections, 
just like learning. In the 1960s, researchers in Oslo observed long-term forms 
of synaptic plasticity in the hippocampus, yet they did not notice the possible 
link between plasticity and memory. This has paved the way, over the years, 
for further discoveries by new researchers, notably Bliss, who appeared in the 
lab in Oslo. In 1973, researchers published a paper, which was first to describe 
LTP (Bliss and Gardner-Medwin 1973). The paper hypothesized these forms of 
long-term synaptic plasticity could be the mechanism for memory consolida-
tion, with the hippocampus being identified as having features required by 
LTP. On one hand, it has a psychological function (supporting memories), and 
on the other hand, its components have synaptic plasticity. It’s a structure on 
the intermediate level between cellular neuroscience and psychology. 
But without further research, the hypothesis that LTP in the hippocampus is 
responsible for memory would be just one of the myriad of other ideas pro-
posed in the search for the engram. Different fields, however, have brought 
their own constraints on LTP: 
The findings in … varied fields and from these different perspectives added their 
own constraints on the mechanism of LTP. Different perspectives could explore, 
for example, different components of the mechanism, different properties of those 
components, different activities in which those components engage or different 
forms of organization among them (Craver 2003, 187). 
But it is notable that the story does not end here. What researchers wanted to 
integrate next was a molecular-level mechanism for LTP. Bickle (2003, 62–75) 
reconstructs one of the molecular hypotheses, but fails to mention it is just 
one of the many, or too many, hypotheses of mechanisms responsible for 
a cellular-level behavior (Sanes and Lichtman 1999; Malenka and Bear 2004). 
One of the critical problems is that LTP is a physiological phenomenon, and 
our current experimental techniques are just too crude to intervene in it pre-
cisely. It’s difficult to design an experiment that would (i) confirm LTP con-
tributes to memory consolidation not only in the hippocampus and elsewhere 
and (ii) indicate its crucial molecular components. 
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Note that one of the implicitly accepted constraints is there is a single molecu-
lar component of synaptic plasticity involved in LTP and LTD (long-term de-
pression of excitatory synaptic transmission). In their influential review pa-
per, Malenka and Bear state that LTP and LTD are not unitary phenomena 
because “their mechanisms vary depending on the synapses and circuits 
in which they operate” (2004, 5). The research assumption is that the cellular 
phenomenon is unitary, only if it has the same molecular mecha-
nism that does not vary depending on the surrounding context. Failing to con-
strain models offered in various experimental settings has led them, there-
fore, to deny LTP is one component; rather, it would rather be a family 
of components. 
The constraint just mentioned is not a finding in itself. One could make two 
decisions faced with the evidence cited by Malenka and Bear. First, one could 
specify the phenomenon that the LTP is supposed to give rise to in more ab-
stract terms, which would lead to making the question the model is supposed 
to answer a little more abstract. Or, second, one could retain the question and 
make multiple LTP models more specific. These strategies are called lumping 
and splitting (Craver 2009, 581–82). While these strategies may fail or succeed, 
depending on how the world is, they are not findings or discoveries. Lumping 
and splitting strategies may create idealized models; we could simply distort 
reality for tractability, simplicity, or some other reason. One important factor 
in the lumping strategy is it could also help theoretical unification, which 
might allow researchers to answer questions why some mechanisms work in 
a similar way by appealing to their similar causal structure (Weber and 
Lefevere 2015). 
Interestingly, in the subsequent years, a new molecular candidate for the 
component of LTP was found, protein kinase Mzeta (PKMζ). The initial studies 
demonstrated a role for the kinase in memory maintenance; disrupting PKMζ 
activity with ζ-inhibitory peptide (ZIP) succeeded in disrupting many estab-
lished associations in several key brain regions (which is a bottom-up inter-
vention). More recent work, however, has questioned the role of PKMζ in 
memory maintenance and the effectiveness of ZIP as a specific inhibitor of 
PKMζ activity, but was not conclusive (for review, see Kwapis and Helmstetter 
2014). It turns out, however, the reason ZIP is ineffective is there is a compen-
satory mechanism, activated if PKMζ should fail (Tsokas et al. 2016). 
So, while causal interventions are difficult because of the complex organiza-
tion of the memory consolidation mechanism, the current experimental evi-
dence seems in favor of the lumping strategy. The complex organization is to 
be expected; after all, memory consolidation is one of the most important 
functions of the brain, and it may contain backup systems. This also shows 
simplistic molecular models—which ignore the cellular and psychological 
mechanisms—are not entirely appropriate because experimental interven-
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tions that disrupt memory in a physiologically unrealistic fashion are held to 
be inconclusive. Physiologically realistic conditions are important because our 
experimental techniques are often too fat-handed and disrupt more compo-
nents than intended. Which conditions are physiologically realistic is deter-
mined also by our behavioral knowledge: this is why the most cited studies on 
LTP come from experiments in vivo in animals in single-trial learning 
(Whitlock 2006). 
To sum up, multiple constraints are at work in the current research on LTP as 
the component of the mechanism of memory consolidation, occurring both in 
the hippocampus and outside it. These constraints are related to experimental 
findings and to strategies, such as lumping and splitting, which are important 
in creating integrated models. Just because there is (as it seems) a mechanism 
that satisfies all the constraints, it is possible to build a coherent model. 
As Craver stresses, the research on LTP is highly interdisciplinary, combining 
electrophysiological and biochemical manipulations to explore the function-
ing of the proposed memory mechanism. This means it is not the case that it is 
just an inter-level integration of two models of mechanisms. In inter-level 
integration, the lower-level mechanism is a proper spatiotemporal part of the 
upper-level mechanism. Rather, multiple considerations are at play, and they 
mutually constrain hypotheses about models of LTP. Arguably, researchers 
treat models as constituting a distributed explanation of a mechanism 
(Hochstein 2015), and this seems to be the case with LTP. Researchers use 
many incomplete models of various properties, components, and operations 
mutually to constrain their overall explanation of the mechanism of LTP. 
 
4. Failures of integration: mirror neurons and the gestural account of 
evolution of language 
In this section, I will show how purported mechanistic integration can fail. To 
do so, I will show that mere consistency of mechanistic hypotheses is not 
enough to achieve integration. A case in point is the explanation of the mech-
anism responsible for sexual orientation in terms of mirror neurons (Ponseti 
et al. 2006). I will argue that, even if this account of sexual orientation is com-
patible with the existence of mirror neurons, the hypothesis that mirror neu-
rons support action orientation does not constrain models of sexual orienta-
tion. The hypothesis that mirror neurons are responsible for action under-
standing does not furnish the mirror neuron account of sexual orientation 
with more explanatory depth. 
In the 1990s, neuroscientists in Parma localized discharges of a group of neu-
rons in both area F5 of the premotor cortex and in parietal area PF of the 
brain of macaques (di Pellegrino et al. 1992). Surprisingly, such discharges 
were reported both when the macaque performed an action and when it ob-
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served another individual performing a similar action. A similar fronto-
parietial network, including the posterior inferior frontal gyrus, adjacent ven-
tral premotor cortex, and the inferior parietal lobule was also observed in 
human brains (Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004), where the structural activa-
tions were observed in subjects observing and imitating actions (see Figure 2). 
This neural system responsible for action observation/execution matching 
was dubbed as the “mirror neuron system” (MNS). The MNS was hypothesized 
to be involved in diverse cognitive functions, including empathy (Gallese 
2003), action understanding (Kohler et al. 2002), intention understanding, lin-
guistic communication (Arbib 2005; Arbib 2012), and finally, sexual prefer-
ences (Ponseti et al. 2006; Mouras et al. 2008). This discovery, if real, would be 
crucial for further development of cognitive neuroscience and cognitive sci-
ence (for a recent review, see (Kilner and Lemon 2013)). 
 
Figure 2: Mirror neuron system (colored) in humans. Source: Scholarpedia. 
 
 
Some theorists, however, are still critical. To begin, there were no direct re-
cordings of mirror neurons in human beings, and there is only a functional 
homologue, whereas some fMRI studies are ambiguous (Lingnau, Gesierich, 
and Caramazza 2009). Others have criticized vehemently the use of the 
MNS hypothesis outside the domain of action imitation and understanding. 
Hickok (2014) also claims the lesions of the MNS do not lead to inhibition of 
action understanding. 
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The issue with the MNS goes deeper as there are multiple attempts at theoreti-
cal and mechanistic integration that fail because the MNS does not explain the 
operations of larger cognitive mechanisms. Selective discharges of the MNS 
neurons cannot explain complex dispositions, such as sexual preferences, as 
observing any other action leads to a selective discharge of such neurons. The 
mention of the MNS plays an ornamental role in sketchy boxological models 
that do not place any constraints on underlying mechanisms. There are virtu-
ally no constraints on intention understanding, unless we can tell what ‘inten-
tions’ are (and one can doubt whether these are really helpful theoretical pos-
its; see (Nanay 2013)).  
Let me turn then to the account that seems to embody a failure of integration, 
the account of sexual orientation in terms of mirror neurons. In a brain imag-
ing study, which consisted of showing the images of aroused human genitals—
with no context—to exclusively homosexual or exclusively heterosexual par-
ticipants, it was found that ventral premotor cortex, “which is a key structure 
for imitative (mirror neurons) and tool-related (canonical neurons) actions 
showed a bilateral sexual preference-specific activation, suggesting that view-
ing sexually aroused genitals of the preferred sex triggers action representa-
tions of sexual behavior” (Ponseti et al. 2006, 825). The hypothesis was that 
three regions of interest (ROIs) might be involved: two regions related to the 
reward system—Centromedian Thalamus (and adjacent ventral striatum) and 
Orbitofrontal Cortex—and Ventral Premotor Cortex—responsible for hypothe-
sized „motor representations of sexual behavior.” 
Instead of speaking of a mechanism for sexual orientation, the authors chose 
the term endophenotype, which is used to talk of hereditary characteristics of 
a  certain condition, which are not its direct symptom. Using the term is not 
limited to evolutionary biology, but also covers psychiatric syndromes. How-
ever, the term is not defined in the paper, but used in the phrase functional 
endophenotype: “we propose that the observed response pattern represents 
a functional endophenotype for sexual orientation in humans” (Ponseti et al. 
2006, 832). It does not seem to be a huge stretch to think the activity of the 
mechanism, whose characteristics are hereditary, is supposed to be causally 
relevant for sexual arousal compatible with one’s sexual orientation (a follow-
up paper no longer uses the term and links mirror neurons to male sexual 
arousal; (cf. Mouras et al. 2008)). Observing aroused genitals is supposed to 
trigger action understanding, and the activation of the ROIs in the fMRI study 
is correlated with genitals being compatible with one’s sexual orientation.  
As Hickok (2014) points out, it is not controversial that human beings can un-
derstand actions and imitate them. However, there is barely any evidence for 
the MNS in humans, and the Broca’s area (the homologue of F5 in macaque 
monkeys) does not seem to have properties of mirror neurons in macaques. 
Hickok points out that actions are understood by human beings, even when 
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the Broca area is lesioned, which should be impossible. Hence, a dissociation 
suggests there is a lack of the mechanistic constraint, which means action un-
derstanding can proceed without the purported MNS. By looking at apraxias 
(motor disorders), Hickok also argues there is a dissociation between the sys-
tem responsible for action understanding and action production.  
Does the activation of MNS explain sexual orientation? Obviously, mere corre-
lation cannot establish the causal connection, and no lesion studies with ROIs 
observed during the experiments are cited in the paper. No interventions us-
ing transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) were done either. So, the evi-
dence supports only the hypothesis that the regions are possible mechanisms 
for sexual orientation. The hypothesis is also incompatible with previous find-
ings about mirror neurons: they are supposed to fire when the animal ob-
serves a specific action executed by another animal and when the animal per-
forms it. So, it would seem they should fire when one observes genitals com-
patible with one’s own sex, irrelevant of one’s sexual orientation. These are 
compatible with one’s actions, in contrast to the genitals of a sexual partner. 
This is not even discussed in the paper (which therefore violates this mecha-
nistic top-down constraint), but let’s suppose there may be an explanation 
why this is not the case. 
The paper fails also to be constrained by our previous knowledge about sexual 
arousal (violates componency constraints). Even if sexual orientation has an 
affectional component, there is evidence that sexual desire and romantic love 
can be dissociated (Diamond 2003); the two can be studied separately. But it 
would be more appropriate to say the study was concerned with sexual 
arousal, and hypothesized one factor of the arousal was sexual orientation. 
So, it is natural to ask whether the ROIs under study were the same as previ-
ously studied for, say, male sexual arousal. Previous Positron Emission To-
mography (PET) studies have shown the highest activation in the claustrum, 
a region whose function had been unclear. Activations were recorded in para-
limbic areas (anterior cingulate gyrus, orbitofrontal cortex), in the striatum 
(head of caudate nucleus, putamen), and in the posterior hypothalamus 
(Redouté et al. 2000). But the a priori hypotheses in the fMRI studies were ap-
parently not wholly positively constrained by this study when picking the 
ROIs; particularly, the claustrum was not studied. Instead, they were con-
strained by the mirror-neuron sensorimotor hypothesis. 
Let me wrap up. The study of the functioning sexual arousal mechanism, 
cryptically dubbed as functional endophenotype, as influenced by sexual orien-
tation, is a clear example of a failure to constrain the models of mechanisms 
of sexual arousal both by previous studies on the topic (using PET scans) and 
by the methodological constraints that require more than mere correlation. 
Instead, mere correlation was observed in the hypothesized system for “motor 
representations of sexual behavior”, localized in the Ventral Premotor Cortex. 
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The hypotheses do not yield a well-supported model of the actual mechanism 
of sexual arousal and do not explain why the arousal is linked to pictures of 
genitals of the preferred sex, rather than the pictures of one’s own sex. All 
these failures are failures to constrain the hypothetical model of the “func-
tional endophenotype” or, rather, a mechanism of sexual arousal as linked 
with a certain sexual orientation. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, I claimed the mechanistic integration of models can be viewed 
in terms of constraints on scientific representations of mechanisms. Both the 
success of integration and its failure are linked to stronger or weaker con-
straints on multiple models of mechanisms. With LTP, numerous mechanistic 
constraints on multiple models of mechanisms seem to create an inter-field 
research framework on the phenomenon, which is driven by constraints on 
possible unitary models of memory consolidation (the lumping strategy is the 
default). With the sexual arousal in relation to MNS, there are almost no 
mechanistic constraints from MNS. The models of sexual arousal are not even 
truth-constrained by previous arousal models, and merely consistent with 
MNS models. 
I have argued that constraints are best understood in terms of certain repre-
sentations—be it experimental findings, theoretical principles, or methodolog-
ical norms—acting upon possible representations of mechanisms. This modi-
fication of the notion of constraint, as used previously in the mechanistic ap-
proaches to integration, has several advantages. First, some constraints used 
by Craver and Darden are not findings—at least not experimental findings. 
These constraints may also include methodological norms and strategies, such 
as lumping or splitting. Second, there is a clear connection to the account on 
constraint-satisfaction developed by Thagard, so integration of models can 
proceed semi-automatically. Third, properly constrained mechanistic models 
may be idealized to be explanatorily appropriate, and to understand this, one 
should allow that constraints operate on representations, rather than act di-
rectly on the space of possible mechanisms. 
Without mechanistic constraints, there is no integration of mechanistic mod-
els. The future work on constraints of mechanistic models should analyze 
multiple kinds of constraints in greater detail and discover different con-
straints recognized by modelers. This could be helpful in distinguishing dif-
ferent kinds of integration, which would further develop Craver and Darden’s 
work. The claim it is the web of constraints that underlies integration seems 
sufficiently well-established to believe that such progress is possible. 
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